which these conversations centered. I go on to discuss how these May Fourth innovations in historical consciousness facilitated the imagination of change in the present, by introducing new ways of thinking about the past and future. Although ostensibly about the character of ''Eastern'' and ''Western'' culture, the debates turned crucially on where participants located China in history: was China's present the mark of a developmental laggard and a failed society, the recrudescence of a living and continuous tradition, or the site of a future global cultural syncretism? These questions stand in marked contrast to the late Qing reform strategies of thinkers such as Liang Qichao (梁啟超 1873 Qichao (梁啟超 -1929 ) and Yan Fu (嚴復 1854-1921), who grounded reform on ''universal laws (公理 gong li)'' of global evolution. It also contradicted nineteenth-century ''essence/use (體用 ti/ yong)'' logic which tended to view culture as a repository of unchanging values outside of time. For both radical and moderate voices of the May Fourth movement, the same passage of time that gave rise to particular cultural formations in other civilizations in the past is now seen to secure the possibility of those same cultural developments elsewhere, in the future. What these May Fourth thinkers shared, then, was not so much a commitment to human universals, as many scholars have assumed, 4 but a faith that the future was the site of cultural transformation and possibility.
EASTERN AND WESTERN CIVILIZATIONS EARLIER ITERATIONS
Theoretical speculation about the nature of differences between ''Eastern'' (or sometimes more specifically ''Chinese'') and ''Western'' civilization emerged as early as the Opium Wars in the mid-nineteenth century. Perhaps its most wellknown motif was ''Chinese learning for essence, Western learning for use (中體西 用 zhong ti xi yong),'' a formulation made famous by Zhang Zhidong (張之洞 1837-1909) in his 1898 tract Exhortation to Learning (勸學篇 Quan Xue Pian). In this essay, written shortly after China's unexpected and humiliating defeat in the Sino-Japanese war, Zhang calls on Chinese elites to adopt in a more thoroughgoing way the instrumental features of Western learning (西學Xi xue).
5 At this time, ''new'' learning was often identified with ''Western'' learning, and even thinkers like Zhang-who included as one of the five main points of his Exhortation to Learning the need to ''understand change''-did not construe newness as a historical concept. 6 Zhang claimed, for example, that the five relationships which constituted the essence of Chinese learning, and ''are the origins of all activity,'' had been ''transmitted for several thousand years without changing their meaning. '' 7 On this view, Chinese learning and Western learning occupied the same synchronous time, leading to supporters of ti/yong to view each side as both distinctive from yet supplementary to the other. 8 Within this framework, newness did not signify a rupture in time so much as spatialized, cultural difference. Ironically, for Zhang these differences brought into relief fundamental similarities between China and the West with respect to key social hierarchies: the ruler/minister, parent/child, and husband/wife relationships in both places look much the same, Zhang argues, although the rites for maintaining them are quite ''crude'' in Western countries. 9 These hierarchical relationships are universal, to Zhang, because they form the basis of all political institutions and intellectual knowledge. 10 In other words, these putative similarities not only demonstrate why China should retain its existing social structures; they also underwrite the very possibility of learning from the West. Only by building on shared foundations can China hope to succeed in exploiting Western knowledge.
Other reformers offered a more radical vision of cultural difference when they attempted to locate China along a path of evolutionary development. For some, such as Kang Youwei (康有爲 1858-1927) and Tan Sitong (譚嗣同 1865-1898), this development would proceed through a series of increasingly peaceful stages, fueled by the extension of human benevolence (仁 ren). It would culminate in a cosmopolitan ''great unity (大同 da tong),'' when all differences separating humanity would be overcome.
11 For their colleague Liang Qichao and the influential translator Yan Fu, however, the utopian future came only after an aggressive struggle for civilizational survival. Strongly influenced by the social Darwinism of Herbert Spencer, many of whose works Yan translated into Chinese, Liang and Yan saw history as driven by the domination of the stronger over the weaker. China could succeed in the global struggle, they argued, only if its people became invigorated with the spirit to defend and unify themselves as a nation. 12 10 Ibid., 36; as historian Liu Longxin has shown, however, the ti/yong binarism had the unintended effect of rupturing equivalences between the West and China, ultimately reducing Chinese learning to a series of distinct ethical principles rather than a more comprehensive system of knowledge that could benefit and be benefitted by Western learning. Drawing from emerging work in sociology and anthropology, Liang called for a new history that would understand China's progress toward the modern era in terms of struggle between and within groups. 13 Yan urged the cultivation of a promethean spirit of individualism-functioning very much like the psychic energy of Tan's benevolence-to drive forward the collective wealth and power of civilization. 14 These reform positions were ultimately more radical because they turned not on synchronous cultural gaps, as Zhang Zhidong's formulations did, but on lags in development along a universal timeline. From this perspective, China appeared more tragically estranged from the West, because its lack of development seemed to deny the possibility that China already shared basic characteristics with successful civilizations. But reformers did not need to ground reform in existing cultural equivalence when history promised eventually to deliver China from its abject state. Being swept up in a global and inevitable trend toward the futurewhat Yan Fu identified with the ''urgency of change in the world (shi bian zhi ji 世 變之亟)''-assured China's eventual convergence with Western nations and their stage of development.
15
By 1915, confronting the fragility of the Chinese polity after the republican revolution, Chinese thinkers had begun to contemplate a more radical break with their past. 16 They continued to historicize the spatialized understanding of ''new'' that marked their reform predecessors, seeing East/West differences as conflicts between historical epochs and not only between different types of national quality or psychology. 17 But their explorations evinced an erosion of confidence in the evolutionary models that drove late Qing reform thought, a turn with both domestic and international origins. Globally scholars were growing critical of the idea of progressive, teleological development. They began exploring instead a more historical approach, influenced by German romanticism. These new understandings of cultural growth were further developed by anthropologists such as Franz Boas, who resisted teleological determinism in favor of examining how individuals and groups interact with their material as well as social environments over time. 18 In China, a lack of confidence in evolutionary models was instigated by revolutionary policies of Sun Yat-sen's Revolutionary Alliance (同盟會 Tongmenghui) which offered a voluntaristic alternative to natural laws of an inexorable history.
19
Reformers also increasingly came to see China's backwardness as more intractable than they originally hoped. reappraisal of Chinese culture's future prospects. 24 The essays debating such views appeared in two of the most influential journals of the time, Eastern Miscellany (東 方雜誌 Dongfang zazhi), under Du's editorship from the journal's founding in 1904 until 1920) and the radical New Youth. According to historian Wang Qisheng, the Eastern and Western civilizations debate marks the first time two journals in China engaged in direct criticism of each other. Chen's virulent (and inaccurate) attacks on defenders of Eastern civilization as imperial restorationists resulted in a publicity triumph for New Youth, which by 1919 had effectively traded places with Eastern Miscellany as the most widely circulated journal of the time. 25 Despite the acrimony of these debates, Wang Yuanhua has noted that they produced some of the first work in China to advance substantive comparative research on Sino-Western culture, which shaped subsequent discussions of Westernization and cultural identity.
26
Both sides array themselves around an East-West binary that organizes the physical location of thought and its movements through space. In many ways their approach resembles that of the late Qing reformers, in that perceived failures of national character spatialize what are ultimately seen to be differences in historical development. For Kang and his colleagues, however, history was a unitary process. Its movement was unilinear and shared by everyone, even if certain societies lagged behind others in embodying its ultimate promise. Liang Qichao could therefore claim China's past had no place in world history, because it had previously lacked transformative contact with the West, which he saw as the most powerful embodiment of that historical telos. 27 It was on the basis of this immanent similarity to Western and all other nations in the world that China could mark its progress and find guidance for reform. With the civilizations debate, however, the spatial binary also marks how thought or ideas move through time within those spaces. History appears not as an unchanging yardstick to mark cultural difference, but as something that itself gives rise to, and bears traces of, diverse civilizational development. This historical consciousness did not as easily support arguments about the inevitable persistence of one cultural heritage over another, but rather encouraged exploration of how historical patterns of development could be replicated or manipulated in other places and times.
Accordingly, these thinkers ask primarily about the kind of past that will inspire a particular kind of (Chinese) future. Is China's past one iteration of a more general, global phenomenon, such that continuing into the future can not only effectively draw from, but may require the proactive imitation of, forms of Western modernity? Or does its own past offer one of the only coherent available platforms for building a better, truly global civilization? Moderate and radical responses to these dilemmas, I argue, stem less from disagreements about the character or persistence of China's cultural heritage than about its capacity to serve as a foundation for future transformation, and what exactly that future might look like.
MODERATE VIEWS
A key touchstone of the debate emerged when Du Yaquan, in his 1916 article ''Quietistic Civilization and Active Civilization,'' suggested that the difference between Eastern and Western civilizations is not one of degree (chengdu) but of kind (xingzhi).
28 For Du, the influential editor of Eastern Miscellany, quietistic civilizations (靜的文明 jing de wenming) are best represented by Easternparticularly Chinese-cultures, and are characterized by fairly homogenous populations that emphasize nature over human agency, family over interactions with strangers, and minimizing conflict rather than accepting it as an inevitable part of existence. 29 The milieu for the active civilization (動的文明 dong de wenming) is the city, with its vibrant and complex atmosphere; for a quietistic civilization, it is the countryside, with a comfortable and self-satisfied atmosphere. 30 Du believes these differences stem from a variety of distinct geographic and historical conditions that gave rise either to conflict and pluralism (in the Western case) or to self-sufficiency and homogeneity (the Chinese case). Because Western society developed on waterways, seacoasts, and peninsulas, for example, it tended toward heterogeneity, externally oriented struggles, and individualism. 31 Li Dazhao's 1918 essay, ''The Fundamental Differences Between Eastern and Western Civilizations,'' further elaborated the consequences of these historical contingencies, tying particular ''activist'' or ''quietistic'' features to the past material challenges of civilizations. According to Li, because Eastern civilizations-members of the ''southern'' belt of societies that Li identifies with Japan, Indo-China, India, Afghanistan, Egypt, and others-enjoyed so much economic prosperity and ease that they failed to cultivate the strenuous dynamism and ambition that characterizes the ''northern'' societies (among which he names Mongolia, Russia, Germany, Holland, Belgium, England, France, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, and Italy). 32 Because the former had a bounty of women, for example, it promoted polygamy; but because the latter had fewer women than men, it promoted single-wife families. In fact, northern 28 Du Yaquan, ''Jing de wenming yu dong de wenming,'' Eastern Miscellany, 13 . 10 (October 1916), 338. Unless otherwise noted, all page numbers for Du's essays cited here refer to the reprints in Xu Jilin and Tian Jianye, eds., Du Yaquan Wencun (Shanghai: Shanghai jiaoyu chubanshe, 2003). 30 Du, ''Jing de wenming,'' 341. 29 Du, ''Jing de wenming,'' 338-40. 31 Du, ''Jing de wenming,'' 338-39. 32 Li, ''Dong Xi wenming genben zhi yi dian,'' Yan zhi, 3 (July 1918); reprinted in Chen Song, WSWX, 57.
belt societies had to fight for survival, forcing their peoples to migrate frequently in search of stability and food. This encouraged simpler, smaller families, Li explains, which in turn led to an emphasis on individualism. Because Eastern civilizations did not feel there was value to fighting for anything, and (as a result of their family structure) did not value individual effort, they tend even now to pessimism and fatalism; in contrast, Western civilizations had to struggle constantly for survival, endowing them with a strong optimism in human agency to transform the future, and cultivating what Li calls (using English words) the ''creative progressionism (創 化主意 chuang hua zhu yi)'' that is the characteristic of ''active'' civilizations. 33 These historical causal narratives support resistance to New Culture radicalism, but not because they signal intransigent allegiance to some fixed Chinese past or reject ''Westernization.'' In fact, Du embraced Western science early in his life, studying calculus and algebra in his early twenties before going on to teach in Western schools and translate books on chemistry and physics.
34 Both Li and Du used their historical narratives of civilizations to project futures for East and West, urging an eventual syncretism of both to take place not only in China but in the world itself. Noting the warm reception in Germany of their colleague Gu Hongming (辜鴻銘 1827-1928) and his popular German-language tracts on Confucian ethics, these moderates suggest that this hybrid future form-what Li calls ''a new third civilization'' beyond both East and West-will salve a battered Europe as much as invigorate a subordinated China.
35 As China's ''second contribution'' to world thought, Li Dazhao believes, this move would combine together ''the best parts'' of Eastern and Western civilization, blending the former's quietism into the latter's activism. 36 This possibility turns, however, on Chinese historical developments substituting for Western ones. As Du explains,
The path to salvation lies precisely in integrating our original civilization, systematizing its foundations so as to render it lucid, and where it has mistakes to correct them. On the one hand we must strenuously import Western theories, and allow them to blend with our original civilization. The fragments of Western civilization are like money strewn on the ground; we can use our original civilization as a thread to tie them together. The wide variety of Western theories today, when you at first hear them, seem to be incompatible with our original civilization; but then when you understand them more fully, you can see that they can enhance and develop certain parts of our original civilization.
37
Part of the problem with using Western civilization as a foundation, Du argues, is that it lacks the unity and continuity of Chinese civilization. In the past few 34 Liu Shaotang, ed., ' 'Du Yaquan (1873 -1933 ,'' Minguo Ren Wu Xiao Zhuan (Taibei: Zhuan ji wen xue, 1975), 71. 35 Li, ''Dong Xi wenming genben zhi yi dian,'' 60. 36 Li, ''Dong Xi wenming genben zhi yi dian,'' 62. 33 Li, ''Dong Xi wenming genben zhi yi dian,'' 58. centuries-especially during the current war-European values have fragmented, and borrowing them leads only to increasing confusion and incoherence. Although some Western ideas-science, democracy, constitutionalism-offer promising solutions to China's current problems, their ''activistic'' qualities offer no integrated system adequate to direct the future course of world civilization.
38
Responding to Chen Duxiu's insinuation that by supporting particular aspects of Chinese civilization he is necessarily opposing republican government, Du points out the similarities between indigenous ideals and Western regime types.
Political regimes may change, but the political principles [behind them] do not. Therefore, taking our indigenous civilization, with ''the way of the ruler, the integrity of the official, and traditional moral teaching (君道臣节 名教纲常 jun dao, chen jie, ming jiao gang chang)'' as its foundation, and blending it with modern political forms in a fully coherent way, is indeed something that an integrated civilization (正統文明 zhengtong wenming) can do.
39
The Chinese cannot adopt features of activist civilizations, in other words, if they repudiate their own past heritage; doing so would be to obliterate the civilizational unity endowed to the Chinese by history and which makes possible their cultural development. 40 Li and Du do not characterize these historical conditions, or the future developments they enable, as universal ones; different civilizations are not all aligned along the same track. Each follows its respective organic path forward. At the same time, however, these historical conditions are not so unique to particular civilizations as to constrain the migration of certain practices or ideas across cultural boundaries. Du believes that the existing Chinese civilization contains enough similarity with the Western past to inaugurate a syncretic, partially Western future on Chinese soil. But, unlike Zhang Zhidong, who two decades earlier posited universal human hierarchies as the shared basis upon which Western learning could proceed in China, Du sees these similarities as coincidences. Democracy and science could flourish in China not because they were autonomous practices independent of their civilizational and social milieus, but precisely because their reliance on this cultural background could already be partially supplied by the existing Chinese civilization. Li goes further, to explore the possibility that the past historical conditions of one civilization could be replicated in the future of the other. He suggests that transforming the economic and social conditions of both Asian and European peoples may be enough to change their thought, if not in the present then in the future-once they generate a 38 Du, ''Mi luan zhi xiandai ren xin,'' 363. 39 44 Although none of these German intellectuals seem ready to embrace this version of Confucianism wholesale, Gu's invitation suggests to what degree Chinese moderates and conservatives saw ''Eastern'' civilization as a portable-if sticky and complex-repository of historically accumulated value, rather than a set of cultural characteristics permanently inhering in some particular ethnic group.
RADICAL VIEWS
This emphasis on the radical mobility of both Chinese and Western values, lifestyles, and even historical trajectories, belies radical accusations (most prominently launched by Chen Duxiu around 1918) that Du and his colleagues hoped to restore the feudal Chinese past. 45 The more striking difference between these two positions lies not in some professed allegiance either to the past or the future, but in their disagreement over how and if the inauguration of ''new 41 Li, ''Dong Xi wenming genben zhi yi dian,'' 66. 42 The Spirit of the Chinese People (Beijing: Peking Daily News, 1915), 72. 43 For discussion of the Japanese perception of Gu, see Ishikawa Yoshihiro, ''Tozai bunmeiron to Nit-Chu no rondan (On Eastern and Western Culture and the Views of Critics in China and Japan),'' in Kindai Nihon no Ajia ninshiki (Kyoto: Kyoto Daigaku Jinbun Kagaku Kenkyujo, 1994), 414-15. 44 Eastern Miscellany, 15 . 6 (June 1918). 45 Chen Duxiu, ''Questions for the Writers of the Eastern Miscellany (Zhi wen Dongfang zazhi jizhe),'' New Youth, 5 . 3 (September 1918), sec. 2. He also rather perfunctorily dismissed the possibility of Europeans learning from Chinese civilization as ''rigmarole'' (meng yi).
thought'' depends on a particular kind of past. Moderates tended to see a new future syncretized from currently localized civilizational characteristics, whichprecisely because they took shape within the trajectory of an existing civilizationcould move across space, given enough time. Radicals, in contrast, attempted to efface the legacy of the Chinese past entirely. The mobility of cultural or civilizational characteristics for these radicals was made possible precisely by rejecting the characterization of Chinese history as a trove of fruitful similarities to the Western past.
In the 1916 essay, ''The Conflict Between Old and New,'' which was published posthumously one year after its author, Huang Yuanyong, was assassinated in San Francisco, Western historical events are arrayed in temporal ways to foreground their generality rather than cultural or spatial specificity. Like Li Dazhao, Huang depicts Western thought as historically rooted, but for Huang this history has produced not a set of civilizational characteristics so much as a body of discourse that has changed through time in response to new challenges and ideas. Huang identifies three stages in the transformation of all thought-the age of unawareness, the age of critique, and the age of consolidation of doctrines-yet historical variation does not, for Huang, comprise an adequate measure of ''old'' and ''new. '' 46 Newness lies as much in the content of thought (思想 sixiang) as in its periodization. To enter the (relatively newer) age of critique, the Chinese must oppose the (older) age of unawareness by rejecting the ''old''-which Huang summarizes as advocating dogmatism rather than criticism, force-based government rather than self-control, integration rather than analysis, and deduction rather than induction. 47 By selecting temporal terms rather than spatial ones, Huang attempts to culturally dissociate ''new thought'' in general from the specificities of Western experience. In doing so, he hopes to establish the grounds for its possibility in other spaces and times. ''Today people like to say that each nation has its own history and habits, and they cannot be forced to be all the same. Of course this is true; but actually this 'dissimilarity' should be understood to be relative, not absolute. '' 48 Huang cannot extricate new thought from Western thought as completely as he claims, however, because he can neither supply a Chinese equivalent to new thought nor sensibly periodize Western history in terms of old and new. The history he offers turns on substance rather than chronology: his examples of ''progressive,'' ''new'' thought are culled from the Western past-namely the scientific spirit of the ancient Greeks-as often as from the present. For these reasons he remains unable to explain on what basis Chinese can enter, and by way of what force they can be driven along, the stream of historical time that transforms their thought from one age to another. Huang's colleague, Chen Duxiu, more directly handles the problem of historically situating the progress to ''new thought.'' He does this not by severing the connection between newness and Westernness, as Huang does, but by transposing a Chinese future onto a Western past. In his essay ''The Year 1916,'' sometimes read as a call to Chinese youth to insert themselves in a stream of modern time, Chen clearly marks the present as the mediator between the past and future. 50 Significantly, however, he locates that past not in Chinese time but in that of ''humanity (人类 renlei)'' and ''the world (世界 shijie),'' two categories he conflates with Western civilization, even as their presence in Chinese space can be established by a distinctly new and temporal attitude on the part of China's youth:
In order to give birth to this century, we must hold our heads up high and accept the responsibility of becoming twentieth-century people, creating twentieth-century civilization, and not remaining dominated by nineteenth century civilization. The progress of human civilization replaces the old with the new, like the flow of water or the path of an arrow; each age transforms and follows from the other. 51 Chen bases this radicalism on the assertion that the Chinese people lack a history. It is their inability to exhibit change across time that condemns their culture to stagnation and justifies the assumption of a new, Western future: ''[As for] Eastern peoples, from the time of hunter-gatherers all the way to [the establishment of] kinship society to now, nothing has changed … kinship society takes family as the standard, and the individual has no rights.'' 52 For Chen, only the West has a history. By adopting Western ideas, China is effectively assuming that history as its own, joining other nation-states as their common history unfolds in modern time and progresses to the future.
In light of this radical call to arms, Du's invocation of China's ''indigenous'' civilization appears as a defense of a present state whose characteristics he believes can continue into the foreseeable future. Du, after all, does not defend the past but rather attempts to give compelling content to a very present form of life, albeit one rooted in a particular historical trajectory and geographic location (Eastern versus Western, countryside versus city), that contrasts with the form of life defended by Chen and other radicals as explicitly ''Western.'' Underlying Chen's assertion, in contrast, is the insight that only by adopting a culture that turns on dynamism, activity, and deliberate efforts at change can temporal distinctions (between past and present, present and future) be meaningful. Chen and Du conflict over more than the normative weight of Chinese and Western civilization; they also disagree about how to characterize the present as a starting point for China's future.
ENVISIONING CHANGE
Reading the Eastern and Western Civilizations debates as conflicts over historical understanding suggests new contours to the characteristic agendas of the New Culture and May Fourth movements. These movements do not simply represent a political match between ''traditionalists,'' who resist modernity out of allegiance to an extinct past, and ''radicals,'' who would destroy a past heritage in the name of progress. Their disagreement rather stems from different responses to the question: in what, or whose, history can China be said to belong? The temporal processes assumed in their conversations thus do more than ascribe Eastern or Western cultural products to particular streams of ''modern'' or ''traditional'' time, as scholars of Chinese modernity have noted. 53 Spatial terms mark not only the places where knowledge circulates, but also the particular pasts-and thus futurestoward which Chinese thinkers align themselves. Their particular ways of thinking about change, then, do not drive their view of Eastern and Western civilizations, but rather emerge out of their exploration of those alternative historical models. 54 These civilizational histories offered alternatives to the universal, homogenous trend of evolution envisioned by late Qing thinkers, which portrayed social and political change in terms of the gradual alignment of Chinese particularity with the European nation-state form. Robert Culp has recently argued that, for many of the Republican-era intellectuals influenced by this vision of a universal, homogenous, and evolving world civilization, ''simultaneous but different trajectories of social, economic, and political change were difficult to imagine.'' 55 Participants in the civilization debates, in contrast, wrestle with a growing awareness that all cultures or civilizations have a historical career whose experiences encouraged the development of certain institutions and attitudes and discouraged others. This awareness gives rise to the novel idea that different civilizations may occupy a shared global space without enduring the same processes of time-their historical developments may be mutually out of joint. The rift between their respective histories undercuts beliefs that earlier had sustained claims to shared global similarity. No longer did thinkers assume that the world's civilizations are inevitably heading in the same direction, arose from the same source, or possess permanent values or proclivities isolated from the flow of time.
It was not the homogeneity of a universal time, then, that compelled Chen Duxiu to demand a break from China's past. If he could assume that Europeanization was an inevitable global trend, he would be better able to picture (as Liang Qichao did) China's past as the embryonic form of a Western future. 56 Instead, precisely because the civilizations debate had introduced the possibility of multiple, distinct historical trajectories, Chen had to think about the 53 E.g. Levenson, Confucian China; Lee, ''In Search of Modernity.'' 54 Cf. Huters, Bringing the World Home, 206, who argues that ''the disposition of each thinker toward the nature of and the possibility for change colored his views of where these changes were to come from and how they were to be effected. ' present as a site for enacting the future without assuming continuity with the Chinese past. His creative solution is to re-draw the path of continuity, connecting China's present to the world's future rather than to China's own past. China becomes part of the world not by contributing its accumulated cultural essences to a global mélange, but by working in the present and future to unite its fate with that of the emerging global order. In practice, of course, drawing that connection was quite difficult, and not only because no ''Western'' models of development ever offered clear and unambiguous guidance. It was also the case, as Sang Bing explains elsewhere in this volume, that the very definition of continuity was elusive. Establishing in China a supposedly more modern and ''authentic'' vernacular, for example, simply shored up a particular and static version of language that defied the evolutionary and cosmopolitan principles driving language reform in the first place. 57 For Chen, however, tying China's present to Europe's future presented very clear and deliberate choices between Western values (represented by ''Mr. Democracy'' and ''Mr. Science'') and Eastern ones:
If you want to endorse Mr. Democracy, you cannot but oppose Confucian religion, the system of rites, chastity, old ethics, and old government. If you want to endorse Mr. Science, you cannot but oppose old art, old religion. If you want to endorse Mr. Democracy, you cannot but endorse Mr. Science, and you cannot but oppose national essence and the old culture. 58 In other words, he envisions the project of modernization and even ''Westernization'' in political terms: its promise is secured not by history but only by human agency working in and through time.
Ironically, because moderate opinion had raised the possibility of alternative trajectories-and thus alternative ways of reading China's past-Chen was able to provide a partial answer to the paradox of fate versus agency that plagued Liang, Kang, and Yan at the turn of the century. As Charlotte Furth has observed, their beliefs in unilinear, world-historical progress were paired with persistent anxiety over the relative incompleteness of that process at any given time. 59 These anxieties rendered deeply ambivalent the role of the reformer as a historical actor: if the end of history is inevitable, what role could any reforming sage possibly play? 60 How could sages remain helpless to stop changes in the world, but at the same time be responsible for holding China back? 61 In contrast, Chen understands the future as the outcome of choices, not the unfolding of a series of inevitable transformations. The realization that political choices needed to be made constitutes the Chinese people's ''final awakening (zui hou zhi jue wu 最後之覺 悟)'' in which they ''take stock of the basic trends going on inside and outside (盱 衡内外之大勢 xuheng nei wai zhi dashi) and begin to ask about ''what stage our people and our nation ultimately occupy. What stage of actions ought they to take (吾國吾民，果居何等地位，應取何等動作也 wu guo wu min, guo ju he deng diwei, ying qu he deng dongzuo ye)?'' 62 For Chen this awakening is first political, and then ethical. It involves coming to terms, first, with the fact that the people, not their leaders, are the primary motors of change and transformation in society; and second that this political capacity is at odds with the ethics of hierarchy that structured political life in traditional Chinese society. 63 China's future demands breaking free of the ''inertia (惰性duo xing)'' that effaced China's history and rendered its people incapable of republican rule. Moderates disagreed with Chen because they rejected not Western institutions, ideas, or even ''modernity,'' but rather the possibility that China's future could be grafted onto a Western present (rather than the other way around). New ways of living demand not only political choices and ethical reorientations, but a domestic historical background to supply the continuity underlying all development-much as Li Dazhao implied that blending quietistic and activist civilizations would demand that Chinese history become the West's future, and vice versa.
Their position presages Li Changzhi's critique of the failures of the May Fourth movement, which blames radicals not for their extremity but for their shallowness. Their movement, to Li, ''was a rushed replay of Western intellectual evolutiononce they stepped onto another person's path, they had to relive that historical experience.'' 66 Radicals like Chen failed to recognize, in other words, that the West, too, had a particular history that both produced and sustained its existing practices, and without reproducing this history they could never effectively grow this cultural transplant in ''the rich nutrients of [their] native soil.'' 67 Du Yaquan's understanding of this historicity emerges only uncertainly, as he seeks reasons for how the originally existing (固有 gu you) Chinese civilization could enjoy normative supremacy over the Western one. Others, such as Li Dazhao, work more forthrightly with the historical embeddedness implied by the civilization vocabulary. Li seemed to believe that China in the future would have to grow a past equivalent to that of the West's in order to replicate its institutions, and that Western nations would also have to adopt particular Chinese forms of life in order to take advantage of the benefits of ''quietistic'' civilizations.
In neither case is the past understood as simply a repository of values, the perpetual and unchanging Chinese ''essence'' that gives meaning to equally unchanging Western ''use.'' ''The West'' and ''China'' appear in these conversations as both targets and agents of deliberate, time-dependent, and contested cultural appropriation. They are spaces whose past is not so much a known entity as it is a source of emergent meaning that derives from, rather than gives rise to, contested visions of an uncertain future. Elaborations of ''Eastern'' and ''Western'' characteristics endow particular pasts with normative weight, but these pasts function to induce dilemmas of choice about the future, rather than to decisively and inevitably point in one direction rather than another. From moderate perspectives, these civilizational tropes mark objects of imitation and thus of mutual transformation in a syncretic future. From more radical perspectives, they are targets of appropriation or rejection whose contrasts only serve to underscore how uncertainly China's path matches that of the West.
In any case, the plasticity of historical consciousness enabled May Fourth thinkers of both camps to investigate the slow and uncertain process of how ideas are diffused across space, transmitted through time, and come to have meaning within localized but not impermeable communities. These new ways of looking at culture may have facilitated the sweeping visions of civilizational transformation offered by Liang Qichao and Liang Shuming in the 1920s. The latter's reworked evolutionism-now rid of the value hierarchy between East and West 68 -turned precisely on the assumption that particular civilizational characteristics migrate across spaces to embody global patterns of evolution. 69 For the former, it became possible to revoke modernity as a progressive temporality, and to discover instead ''a dynamic anthropological space in separate but interacting cultural systems, which became accessible and appreciable only in a new global imaginary of difference.'' 70 
CONCLUSION
When the synthesis, rejection, or appropriation of Western norms and practices is understood as a process that takes place in and through time, their diffusion becomes a matter of deliberate selection in the present, open to future contingency. The East-West civilizations discourse reveals just how fragile and ambivalent is the future of ''Western'' civilization in the ''East''-a contingency that undercuts claims to the universality and naturalness of Western histories, claims, and knowledge. 71 Far from shoring up Western modernity as a universal goal, these May Fourth attempts to emulate and resist it actually contest a priori claims about the normative status or applicability of its ideas, institutions, and way of life. Even for radical perspectives such as Chen's, which see a clear similarity of values among all the ''ordered'' countries of the world, the West and its values are the objects of political action, and no longer the telos of history. 72 The debate therefore troubles the persistence and permanence, if not existence, of the discursive authority of the modern West.
Ironically, this instability of Western modernity-or at least, its delegation from the category of historical certainty to one of political promise-makes available new space to envision China's place in the modern world. In understanding localized cultural characteristics as emerging from a past whose future transmission was radically indeterminate, participants clear ground for the recognition of global difference. They also, however, enable new forms of connection between otherwise disparate groups, by showing how the very passage of time, which endowed civilizations with particular characteristics, facilitates rather than inhibits the adoption of those characteristics elsewhere. For proponents of the radical argument, the mobility of Western science and democracy enabled Chinese modernization. From a more moderate perspective, the integrity of Chinese civilization assures the success of Western cultural grafts, even as the historically tight but now uncertain attachment of Confucian ethics to its native society becomes rearticulated as a capacity for their broader application to non-Asian societies, most particularly postwar Europe.
The point of their ''Eastern'' and ''Western'' tropes, then, may not be to sort civilizational characteristics into categories of the inevitably universal and the irredeemably particular (read: ''cultural''), but to facilitate the travel of cultural products and practices across the spatial as well as temporal boundaries originally seen to contain them. By denying the inevitable inherence of cultural characteristics in particular persons or groups, the May Fourth debate reveals ''East'' and ''West'' to be spatial categories deeply contingent on human actions to situate communities within a variety of alternate trajectories. These thinkers thus made it possible to see the future, and not only the past, as a site of cultural identification and possibility.
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